Taken from the Lex Scripta Library at Angel Ronan Consulting. Greenfield Urban Firm Consulting is not a Corporation. See us for our full legal services. Angel Ronan, Greenfield Urban Firm Consulting(an association sharing a telephone): 1-647-701-9478.
A new article will discuss the jurisprudence of competing oaths which could be unique to the more provincial common law jurisdiction. The issue is that if the matter cannot be proven on the evidence as necessary with proof of the two requisite elements, then the matter should be withdrawn according to R. vs. King(1962) SCC; a most honorable judgment of this most hallowed Court. It should not remain in a criminal court since there is no evidence to satisfy the burden of proof; proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If it is just a competition of oaths, the matter is really a question of high probability and not cold evidence of an actual event and should be dealt with in the civil courts where the competition of oaths can be satisfied in a realm where the balance of probability is the requisite and appropriate burden of proof for all the hot air coming out Comistad's chicken run down a*s after all. What de a&s are dese people playin and sayin buoy? Isnt dis de law of de West Indies also and all de Commonwealth countries; lands in which they have been distributing the hallowed sacraments and the hallowed English common law since at least 1652? So, What de a&s is going on in Desoronto? This criminal common law is also applicable immediately in the United States and also in Africa with some variation as to offences and also defenses but the principles in establishing guilt or innocence remain the same with precisely the same burdens of proof. This internationalism began along time ago so that the King of the entire world could have some certainty as to the property he owns. You may not like the accused who could be an a*s also but being an a*s is not reason to be deprived of English or American justice just because you are a Guyanese American Immigrant with television show awards and Dutty Bookman dna. There are many A""es who make spurious and malicious complaints which is an offense in itself and also a mockery of the court as if the expectation is that the shame, malfeasance, wickedness and bitterness of a strange Salem Witch and adulterous woman is the bastion of the court; the bastion to be protected. Justice must prevail and Fat Albert should be on TV again. By the way, Dr. Murray was also innocent but juries are not required to get anything right. Forgetting to note one or two attendances on a chart could be malpractice to be dealt with by a medical administrative review of conduct. It could be evidence of a cancelled appointment since the register was checked against scheduled appointments for consistency. But, this is not murder. He is entitled to a retrial on the issue of a jury misdirection. Are you not entertained?
https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/4009/index.do
See R. v. King for more Supreme Court of Canada R. v. King, [1962] S.C.R. 746 Date: 1962-06-25 Her Majesty The Queen (Plaintiff) Appellant; and Grant E. King (Defendant) Respondent. 1962: March 15, 16; 1962: June 25. Present: Taschereau, Locke, Martland, Judson and Ritchie JJ. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO. Criminal law—Driving motor vehicle while ability impaired by drug—Drug administered as anaesthetic by dentist—Accused warned not to drive until his head was perfectly clear—Whether driver guilty—Whether mens rea a necessary element of the offence—Criminal Code , 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, ss. 222, 223. [Page 747] The accused went to his dentist by appointment to have two teeth extracted. He was injected with a drug known as sodium pentothal, a quick-acting anaesthetic. Earlier, he had been required to sign a printed form containing a warning not to drive after the anaesthetic until his head had cleared. After he regained consciousness, the nurse in attendance, to whom he appeared to be normal, warned him not to drive until his head was “perfectly clear”. He replied that he intended to walk. The accused said that he heard no such warning and did not remember signing any form containing a warning. He remembered getting into his car and that while driving he became unconscious. His car ran into the rear of a parked vehicle. Medical evidence was given that his mental and physical condition (he was staggering and his co-ordination was poor) was consistent with the after-effects of the drug in question which may induce a state of amnesia accompanied by a period during which the subject may feel competent to drive a car and in the next second be in a condition in which he would not know what was happening.
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The accused stated that he did not know anything about this drug. He was charged and convicted of the offence of driving a motor vehicle while his ability to do so was impaired by a drug, contrary to s. 223 of the Criminal Code . After a trial de novo before a County Court judge under s. 720 of the Code, his conviction was affirmed. The Court of Appeal granted him leave to appeal and quashed the conviction. The Crown was granted leave to appeal to this Court on the question as to whether mens rea relating to both the act of driving and to the state of being impaired was an essential element of the offence. Held: The appeal should be dismissed. Per
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Taschereau J.: There can be no actus reus unless there is a willpower to do an act whether the person knows or not that it is prohibited by law. In the present case, intention was not to be confused with mens rea. Intention is an element of the offence in question only when the offender voluntarily takes liquor or a drug. There must be an act proceeding from a free will which may bring about the mental condition necessary to meet the requirements of s. 223 . When a doctor has given an injection of a drug to a patient, who is not aware of the state of mind it may produce, there is no volitive act done by the patient and he could not be convicted under s. 223 .
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Per Locke and Judson JJ.: The question of law propounded did not arise upon the facts found at the trial de novo by the County Court judge who found as a fact that the accused knew that he had had a drug and that he was warned not to drive after the anaesthetic, but did not find that the accused’s condition was such that he could not appreciate the warnings given to him. The Court of Appeal found that the accused believed that the drug did not possess properties which would impair or were likely to impair his ability to drive or that he was led to believe and honestly believed that the drug could not have the effect of impairing such ability. These findings were directly in conflict with those of the trial judge. However, as the Crown did not ask leave to appeal on the ground that the Court of Appeal had exceeded its jurisdiction and that question was not argued, the proper course was to dismiss the appeal.
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Per Martland and Ritchie JJ.: The enactment of s. 223 of the Criminal Code added a new crime to the general criminal law, and neither the language in which it was enacted nor the evil which it was intended to [Page 748] prevent are such as to give rise to a necessary implication that Parliament intended to rule out mens rea as an essential ingredient of the crime therein described. When it has been proved that a driver was driving while his ability was impaired by alcohol or a drug, a rebuttable presumption arises that his condition was voluntarily induced. But if it appears that the impairment was produced as a result of using a drug in the form of medicine on a doctor’s order or recommendation and that its effect was unknown to the patient, the presumption is rebutted. Mens rea need not necessarily be present in relation both to the act of driving and to the state of being impaired in order to make the offence complete. The defence that the accused became impaired through no act of his own will and could not reasonably be expected to have known that his ability was impaired or might thereafter become impaired when he undertook to drive and drove his motor vehicle, was a good defence in this case. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario[1], reversing the conviction of the accused. Appeal dismissed. W.C. Bowman, Q.C., for the appellant. Irving Himel, Q.C., for the respondent.
By Warren A. Lyon, Managing Director of the comparative Lex Scripta Service at Angel Ronan Consulting.
https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/4009/index.do
See R. v. King for more Supreme Court of Canada R. v. King, [1962] S.C.R. 746 Date: 1962-06-25 Her Majesty The Queen (Plaintiff) Appellant; and Grant E. King (Defendant) Respondent. 1962: March 15, 16; 1962: June 25. Present: Taschereau, Locke, Martland, Judson and Ritchie JJ. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO. Criminal law—Driving motor vehicle while ability impaired by drug—Drug administered as anaesthetic by dentist—Accused warned not to drive until his head was perfectly clear—Whether driver guilty—Whether mens rea a necessary element of the offence—Criminal Code , 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, ss. 222, 223. [Page 747] The accused went to his dentist by appointment to have two teeth extracted. He was injected with a drug known as sodium pentothal, a quick-acting anaesthetic. Earlier, he had been required to sign a printed form containing a warning not to drive after the anaesthetic until his head had cleared. After he regained consciousness, the nurse in attendance, to whom he appeared to be normal, warned him not to drive until his head was “perfectly clear”. He replied that he intended to walk. The accused said that he heard no such warning and did not remember signing any form containing a warning. He remembered getting into his car and that while driving he became unconscious. His car ran into the rear of a parked vehicle. Medical evidence was given that his mental and physical condition (he was staggering and his co-ordination was poor) was consistent with the after-effects of the drug in question which may induce a state of amnesia accompanied by a period during which the subject may feel competent to drive a car and in the next second be in a condition in which he would not know what was happening.
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The accused stated that he did not know anything about this drug. He was charged and convicted of the offence of driving a motor vehicle while his ability to do so was impaired by a drug, contrary to s. 223 of the Criminal Code . After a trial de novo before a County Court judge under s. 720 of the Code, his conviction was affirmed. The Court of Appeal granted him leave to appeal and quashed the conviction. The Crown was granted leave to appeal to this Court on the question as to whether mens rea relating to both the act of driving and to the state of being impaired was an essential element of the offence. Held: The appeal should be dismissed. Per
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Taschereau J.: There can be no actus reus unless there is a willpower to do an act whether the person knows or not that it is prohibited by law. In the present case, intention was not to be confused with mens rea. Intention is an element of the offence in question only when the offender voluntarily takes liquor or a drug. There must be an act proceeding from a free will which may bring about the mental condition necessary to meet the requirements of s. 223 . When a doctor has given an injection of a drug to a patient, who is not aware of the state of mind it may produce, there is no volitive act done by the patient and he could not be convicted under s. 223 .
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Per Locke and Judson JJ.: The question of law propounded did not arise upon the facts found at the trial de novo by the County Court judge who found as a fact that the accused knew that he had had a drug and that he was warned not to drive after the anaesthetic, but did not find that the accused’s condition was such that he could not appreciate the warnings given to him. The Court of Appeal found that the accused believed that the drug did not possess properties which would impair or were likely to impair his ability to drive or that he was led to believe and honestly believed that the drug could not have the effect of impairing such ability. These findings were directly in conflict with those of the trial judge. However, as the Crown did not ask leave to appeal on the ground that the Court of Appeal had exceeded its jurisdiction and that question was not argued, the proper course was to dismiss the appeal.
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Per Martland and Ritchie JJ.: The enactment of s. 223 of the Criminal Code added a new crime to the general criminal law, and neither the language in which it was enacted nor the evil which it was intended to [Page 748] prevent are such as to give rise to a necessary implication that Parliament intended to rule out mens rea as an essential ingredient of the crime therein described. When it has been proved that a driver was driving while his ability was impaired by alcohol or a drug, a rebuttable presumption arises that his condition was voluntarily induced. But if it appears that the impairment was produced as a result of using a drug in the form of medicine on a doctor’s order or recommendation and that its effect was unknown to the patient, the presumption is rebutted. Mens rea need not necessarily be present in relation both to the act of driving and to the state of being impaired in order to make the offence complete. The defence that the accused became impaired through no act of his own will and could not reasonably be expected to have known that his ability was impaired or might thereafter become impaired when he undertook to drive and drove his motor vehicle, was a good defence in this case. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario[1], reversing the conviction of the accused. Appeal dismissed. W.C. Bowman, Q.C., for the appellant. Irving Himel, Q.C., for the respondent.
By Warren A. Lyon, Managing Director of the comparative Lex Scripta Service at Angel Ronan Consulting.
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