R. c. Mankala-Proulx, 2013 QCCQ : accused persisted in making numerous false statements to the various police officers, and readily added details during the investigation. He could have recanted on many occasions, but dug in his heels instead.
Date:
2013-06-12
File number:
550-01-046353-092
Citation:
R. c. Mankala-Proulx, 2013 QCCQ 6721 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fznsf>, retrieved on 2020-03-26
R. c. Mankala-Proulx
|
2013 QCCQ 6721
| |||||
COURT OF QUÉBEC
| ||||||
CANADA
| ||||||
PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC
| ||||||
DISTRICT OF
|
HULL
| |||||
LOCALITY OF
|
GATINEAU
| |||||
Criminal Division
| ||||||
No.
|
550-01-046353-092
| |||||
DATE:
|
June 12, 2013
| |||||
______________________________________________________________________
| ||||||
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE RICHARD LAFLAMME J.C.Q.
| ||||||
______________________________________________________________________
| ||||||
THE QUEEN
| ||||||
Complainant
| ||||||
v.
| ||||||
STEVEN MANKALA-PROULX
| ||||||
Accused
| ||||||
______________________________________________________________________
| ||||||
SENTENCE
| ||||||
______________________________________________________________________
| ||||||
3. Between June 7, 2009 and June 16, 2009, in Pontiac, district of Hull, did, with intent to mislead, cause Sergeant Detective François Berger, a peace officer to enter on or continue an investigation by making a false statement that accuses some other person of having committed an offence, to wit: dangerous operation (driving) of a motor vehicle, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by section 140(1)a) (2)a) of the Criminal Code.
[2] The Court must now sentence the accused for this crime, for which he is liable to imprisonment for five years. The Crown is seeking an exemplary sentence of 12 months in prison, while the defence proposes that the accused be sentenced to imprisonment in the community.
I. THE FACTS
[3] The following is the account of the facts accepted by the accused after his guilty plea. On June 7, 2009, the accused's mother, Barbara Mankala, contacted the MRC des Collines police department to file a complaint against Officer Jennifer Cross. She alleged that the officer followed her son Steven's all-terrain vehicle (hereafter "ATV") in her patrol car and pushed him into the ditch with it. She added that the officer then fled the scene. As a result of the accident, her son was reportedly pinned under the ATV; he was apparently rescued by the friends who were with him at the time. They left, leaving the ATV at the site. They returned later, got the ATV out of the ditch and took it to the home of a cousin of the accused. The ATV was damaged.
[4] An initial statement was taken from the accused by an officer with MRC des Collines police department; a second one was taken by a superior officer. Since the statements reported an indictable offence committed by a peace officer, the case was immediately transferred to the Sûreté du Québec, more specifically to investigator François Berger, who met with several witnesses, including the accused. Needing additional information, investigator Berger met with the accused again, on June 9, 2009. The accused said that he was pushed while his ATV was in motion. He did not see the vehicle push him, but he felt it. He affirmed that he was not fleeing the police at the time; he was merely crossing the bridge. He was pushed for 15 to 30 seconds while travelling at about 15 km/h. He added that he tried to brake, but the patrol car was still pushing his ATV. He gave the names of 14 potential witnesses to the incident. The accused was met with again, on June 12, 2009. He explained again how the accident happened and that he was pinned under his ATV. Before the accident, his vehicle was running well. He said that the accident happened on June 5 but that he did not report it until June 7 at 8:30 p.m. The investigation did not turn up any trace of that call. The accused was also met with on June 16, 2009 by investigator Berger, again for additional information. He was met with again, on July 8, 2009, the investigation having led to the recovery of the patrol car's video recording. The investigator showed the video to the accused. In it, two ATVs can be seen travelling illegally on the public road. One of the ATVs was driven by Émilie Dubeau, the other, by the accused. The police officer started to give chase while still a long way from the ATVs. The accused's ATV can be seen rapidly turning off onto a trail. The police officer continued to pursue the other ATV for 1.1 kilometres, until the driver turned off onto a trail, at which time the officer lost track of the second ATV. After viewing the video, the accused left without further comment.
[5] The evidence shows that what should have been a routine interception for an offence under the Highway Safety Code became a brief chase during which the accused turned off onto a trail. It appears that the brakes on the accused's ATV failed, with the result that he ended up at the bottom of the ditch. The ATV was appraised. An accident reconstruction specialist reconstructed the accident with the two vehicles presumed to have been involved. According to the computer data in the patrol car's bumpers, there was no impact on that day. A video of the chase was not recovered until a few days later.
[6] Following the preparation of the pre-sentence report, which the Court will comment on later, the prosecution called Officer Cross to testify as to the consequences of the crime. Investigator François Berger also testified, about the steps and actions he took in his investigation.
[7] Officer Cross has been a police officer since April 2007. She stated that she was on duty on June 5, 2009 in the Quyon area. She said she saw four all-terrain vehicles travelling on the public road. She did a U-turn in order to intercept the offenders. However, they managed to get away on off-road trails. Three days later, she was called to a meeting by her superiors. She was told that it was alleged she had committed a crime, namely, that she had hit an ATV and fled the scene of the accident. She was informed of her right to remain silent and her right to an attorney. The conversation was short because she had to leave to testify in Court in another case. She was upset about the accusation, which she knew was false. It was totally incomprehensible to her that someone could invent such a story. She was worried about the outcome.
[8] The repercussions included patrol reassignment to another sector. Having to go to a different sector for her shift reminded her of the alleged fault every time she went to work. Certain colleagues were unhappy about giving up their usual sector and being assigned to the Quyon area. When she testified, she had not yet been reassigned to the territory she had been patrolling prior to June 5, 2009. Conflicts arose with her colleagues as a result. It was an especially uncomfortable situation because it was a small police station. She could not discuss the matter with her colleagues. Her spouse was the only person to whom she could talk but, not being a police officer himself, he was unable to fully appreciate how difficult things were for her. She began to be wary of the public, even of ordinary citizens. There was also the enormous stress caused by the situation. She testified that she had nightmares for several months and would wake up covered in sweat. Before each meeting with her attorney, she was so anxious as to feel nauseous. She said she had to rebuild her confidence.
[9] On June 23, 2009, she was greatly relieved to learn that the patrol car video had been recovered. She said that, despite that good news, she continued to be stressed about the whole affair. She acknowledged that she was doing better and that she had not needed medical follow-up.
[10] Investigator Berger recapped the process that is set in motion when an indictable offence is alleged against a police officer. The police force to which the officer belongs must immediately inform the minister that one of its members is under investigation. The case is then handed over to a specialized squad. That is how he came to be mandated to investigate Officer Cross's conduct.
[11] First, investigator Berger met with the director of the police force of the MRC des Collines police department, who referred him to Lieutenant Dubé. The latter gave him all of the reports, a shoe and two statements by the complainant. The first statement had been given to a sergeant at the station and the second, to a superior officer. Investigator Berger said that he met with the accused three times during his investigation. The first two times, he obtained written statements describing the events having given rise to the complaint. In total, the accused made four statements. The third meeting consisted essentially of the accused's arrest.
[12] Apart from taking the accused's statements, investigator Berger met with over 40 witnesses, several of them suggested by the accused. A number of the witnesses refused to talk, while others had not seen anything. Only three to five witnesses were actually relevant.
[13] Officer Cross was also questioned; even her spouse was.
[14] The investigation lasted one month. Seizure of the patrol vehicle was necessary so the technician could remove the vehicle's hard disc. The technician had to contact the U.S. manufacturer in order to retrieve the data, including the images on the hard disc. The patrol vehicle was also used to reconstruct the incident.
[15] Following his investigation, he submitted his report to Justice department. On November 3, 2009, the attorney in charge of the case determined that there were no grounds on which to charge Officer Cross.
[16] The accused testified at the sentencing stage.
[17] He stated that he had trouble admitting his responsibility, because he had been under a lot of pressure from his family, particularly his mother and her spouse. He added that, while he personally had never been in trouble with the police, his family did not like them. He had not wanted to file a complaint, but did so because of the pressure. He had not wanted his mother to be angry.
[18] He broke his shoulder in the accident. He has since had problems that prevent him from playing sports. He said that he has been under a lot of stress, on a daily basis, since the accident. He took antidepressants for a year. His sister who was seriously ill reportedly died because of the additional stress. His mother believes that the video recording exonerating the police officer is fake. In terms of his empathy for the police officer he falsely accused, he said he was sorry in a way and glad she is now happy. Nevertheless, he tried to justify his act by saying that it was not the first time a police officer had pushed someone in Quyon. He added that the police officer should have known how to cope with the stress inherent in this case. He reiterated that he felt himself being pushed by the police officer, even though the video shows she stayed well behind the ATV.
[19] He said that he has been harassed constantly by the police since the affair. However, when cross-examined on that point, it seems that there was nothing more than a regular patrol of his street. He admitted that the police never stopped in front of his house.
II. SENTENCING OBJECTIVES
[20] Sections 718, 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code set forth the purposes and principles of sentencing:
718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.
718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles:
(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, . . ;
. . .
(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;
(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;
(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and;
(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.
III. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES
[21] First, a sentence must be proportionate to the responsiblity of the accused and the gravity of the offence committed. In addition, it must be determined on a case-by-case basis and personalized.
[22] The accused was 20 years old at the time of the events. He took courses in small-engine repairs. However, he wants to go back to school to finish his automobile mechanics program. His testimony in this regard was not very convincing, even confused. The probation officer noted that as well. Although the training in small-motor repairs was to last only two years, he has not yet completed it. He has not done anything relative to his plan to upgrade his training.
[23] This young man, now 24 years old, is easily influenced. More specifically, despite being an adult, he is still influenced by his mother. He has had a girlfriend for a year and a half, which the probation officer sees as a positive development. He had an unconventional upbringing and, by his own admission, grew up around people who detest police officers. The probation officer observed an emotional fragility that would require professional assistance in order for the accused to take charge of his life.
[24] Aside from the accused's personal characteristics, the Court must take into account any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence and/or the offender.
[25] The Court accepts the following aggravating factors:
● The nature of the false accusation, that is, the commission of serious indictable offences.
● The false accusation was made against a peace officer in the execution of her duty.
● A thorough and long investigation was conducted. A specialized squad investigated the accused's allegation. Dozens of witnesses were interviewed. Expert assessments were done.
● The accused persisted in making numerous false statements to the various police officers, and readily added details during the investigation. He could have recanted on many occasions, but dug in his heels instead.
● The crime had major consequences for the victim. There were many repercussions in the workplace. The victim is still dealing with consequences.
● Both in his meeting with the probation officer and during his testimony, the accused showed a flagrant lack of empathy for the victim.
● The accused downplays his responsibility. He sees himself more as a victim in this case.
● According to the pre-sentence report, the accused has little awareness of the consequences of his act and, given the unconventional culture he grew up in, the risk of reoffending cannot be ruled out. The accused's testimony confirmed this assessment of the probation officer.
[26] The Court takes into account the following mitigating factors:
● The accused acknowledged his guilt, subject to the comments of the probation officer and to his testimony concerning his mitigation of the facts.
● The young age of the accused.
● He does not have a criminal record.
● The complaint was made initially by his mother, who has definite influence over her adult son.
● He suffered a depression following the events and is still somewhat fragile emotionally.
[27] Handing down a sentence that is similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances is a delicate exercise, because it is sometimes difficult to come up with judgments involving similar offenders, offences and circumstances. However, the jurisprudence can be used to determine the range of sentences possible in cases similar to this one. The parties filed a number of decisions.[1] The Court also came up with some, from which teachings can be derived.
[28] Certain main points can be identified in the decisions consulted. The Court will limit itself to commenting the cases in which people were falsely accused, as sentences are substantially different in nature when there is no real victim.
[29] First, in the majority of the decisions, public mischief is a serious offence committed against the administration of justice, especially when people are falsely accused. The principles of denunciation and deterrence generally win out over rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Sentences of detention are generally rendered against the offenders. This is especially so when the person targeted by the false accusation is a peace officer. Here are a few examples of these jurisprudential principles.
[30] In R. v. Little,[2] the Court of Appeal for British Columbia reduced a woman's sentence from nine months' imprisonment to three months. The accused, who was 27 years old, had no criminal record and was of fragile mental health, told her boyfriend that she had been sexually assaulted by three men in a vehicle. It was the boyfriend who lodged a complaint with the police. Throughout the investigation, the accused maintained her version. An individual was arrested and spent 14 hours in jail. His vehicle was also searched. After four days of investigatioin, Little finally admitted that the allegation was false. The Court of Appeal considered a conditional sentence of imprisonment. It had this to say that can be applied to the present case:
18 Although in principle a conditional sentence may meet the requirements of deterrence and denunciation, in my view it could only do so on strict terms of house arrest in the vein discussed in R. v. Proulx. The proposed terms here describe virtual house arrest with visits from Ms. Little's family. However, the material before the Court does not satisfy me that such restricted social interaction, in the circumstances of Ms. Little's health and the dynamics of her family as they are made known to the court, would be conducive to Ms. Little's rehabilitation, or even her physical and mental well-being, or that, considering these factors, it would be protective of the community as contemplated by the objectives of the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code.
[31] In R. v. Ambrose,[3] a woman accused a police officer of sexually assaulting her in a cell. Apart from the nature of the false accusation and the short duration of the investigation (nine hours), some similarities can be found. In that case, had it not been for a surveillance camera in the cell, the young police officer could have suffered serious consequences. The case points to the possible consequences of public mischief especially when a police officer is involved:
26 Some violations of s. 140(1) would not be very harmful, and would only lead to the police wasting their time and resources. For example, one might report a case of arson, yet a visit to the scene would show that no building revealed any signs of fire damage.
27 This case is very different. It is usually impossible to prove conclusively that sexual activity did not occur at all; very commonly the person accused has but his or her own denial to offer against the accusation. Had it not been for the lucky fact that the cell in question was monitored by television from three locations, and that at least one monitor was watched much of the time, the constable accused would likely not have been actually cleared.
28 It is true that further investigation might have left the alleged sexual assault too uncertain to prosecute, but the constable could well have remained under a cloud of suspicion forever. Many of the things which served to discredit the appellant's story so conclusively were lucky happenstance, such as the fact that the janitors with access to the relevant cell area neither wore glasses nor were "Oriental". Had one or two coincidences left any shred of evidence which seemed to confirm the appellant's story, the constable might well have had to undergo a disciplinary or a criminal trial. Had he been convicted, he would beyond a doubt been [sic] sentenced to a number of years in a federal penitentiary. The constable accused here was so junior that he was still a probationary constable, fresh out of training. Had the matter been left cloudy, and he not been positively cleared, his career might well have foundered there.
. . .
30 . . . The police acted most energetically as soon at [sic] the allegations were made. A considerable number of senior officers were called out in the middle of the night to coordinate efforts. Other police conducted searches and interrogations. Janitors were rousted out of their residences in the very early hours, after they had gone off duty. The constable accused was roused early in the morning, his clothes were seized, and he was taken down to police headquarters for extended questioning. So was the other constable who had worked with him in the arrest of the appellant.
[32] The Court of Appeal for British Columbia pointed out that this type of crime insidiously undermines the judicial system, because it erodes the trust that all are entitled to have in the system:
31 The harm to the public is even worse. Our whole system of courts and justice depends heavily upon truthful accounts of past occurrences. We have dismantled most of the legal requirements for confirmatory evidence. Heavy punishment for very serious crimes (other than treason and perjury) may be levied on one person's word. Even if an accused is ultimately acquitted, he or she will likely suffer mental tortures for several years, and have to pay huge sums of money to retain lawyers. Even legal aid is not really free; one is required to repay it when one can afford to do so.
32 If the criminal law were seen to convict the innocent, respect for law and punishment would evaporate. If judges and juries became unwilling to convict without confirmatory evidence, then they would silently reintroduce all the requirements of confirmatory evidence which Parliament and the Supreme Court of Canada have repealed in the last fifteen years. The evils of such a requirement for confirmation have been well described by the Supreme Court, on a number of occasions. If complainants were thought often to "cry wolf" (in the words of the old fable), then few complainants would be believed. And a host of crimes would go unpunished and (ultimately) undeterred.
[33] Being divided, the Court reduced the sentence of two years less a day to one year and 41 weeks. The dissenting judge would have instead sentenced the woman to a 12-month sentence to be served in the community.
[34] In R. v. Coupal,[4] our Court of Appeal amended, to a conditional sentence of 23 months' imprisonment, the sentence of 12 months' imprisonment that had been imposed on a woman having falsely stated that another woman, who had rejected her, was preparing an attack. The deceit was uncovered rapidly by the police.
[35] In L.T. v. R.,[5] the Court of Appeal of Québec amended a sentence of imprisonment of 23 months less a day to a conditional sentence of imprisonment. In that case, the accused alleged that a neighbour had sexually abused her. The neighbour was charged and even stood trial; he was acquitted. The accused filed against the same victim another complaint of new occurrences of sexual assault. She was a minor and a referral to the criminal division for adults was ordered. A psychiatric report indicated that she suffered from a severe borderline personality disorder with possible factitious disorder and dissociative identity disorder.
[36] The Court of Appeal of New Brunswick[6] upheld the sentence of three months' detention imposed on a 34-year-old woman who had falsely stated that she was a victim of robbery committed by youths. Four youths were arrested. Three of them suffered serious injuries when they were bitten by a police dog. The police realized that the accusation of the accused was false. The accused had a significant criminal record.
[37] In R. v. Evenden,[7] the accused wrote to the Solicitor General of Canada and the provincial Attorney General to file a complaint against two officers with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. He contended that the officers had conspired to have him sentenced in a drug case. The trial judge suspended sentencing and placed the accused under probation for two years. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal replaced that ruling by a six-month sentence of imprisonment.
[38] Although there was no victim per se, our Court of Appeal[8] sentenced an individual having falsely reported that an explosive substance had been placed somewhere. In first instance, he was sentenced to an intermittent sentence of imprisonment of 90 days with three years' probation. The Court intervened at the appellant's request to have the sentence served on consecutive days.
[39] In Teasdale v. R.,[9] the Superior Court of Québec, per Benoît Moulin J., granted the appeal from a summary conviction in which the accused sought to have charges brought against a municipal police officer and six other people. The incidents were premeditated. The accused did not have a criminal record. The trial judge sentenced the accused to five months' imprisonment in the community in one case, and to four months' imprisonment, in the community as well, in the other case. The trial judge erred in considering the objective gravity of five years, whereas it was merely a summary conviction. In addition, a psychiatric report that greatly reduced the accused's criminal responsibility was allowed in evidence at the appeal. On the basis of those two elements, the accused's sentence was amended to fines of $250 and $1000.
[40] In R. v. Gould,[10] the Provincial Court of Newfoundland and Labrador handed down a conditional sentence of four months of imprisonment in the case of a woman who pleaded guilty to falsely accusing her spouse of assault. The spouse was detained overnight, then had to appear several times in Court while awaiting his trial, at which he was acquitted because the prosecution did not adduce any evidence. The accused even gave a video statement and had bruises supposedly caused by her spouse photographed. The decision is also of interest because Gorman J. cites numerous cases in which the range of sentences varies between three and 12 months of imprisonment.
[41] In R. v. T.S.,[11] the Ontario Court of Justice handed a 38-year-old woman a conditional discharge of 75 hours of community service. The accused falsely stated to the police officer that the man who had supposedly sexually assaulted her and who was on terms had breached his undertaking. The victim spent four days in custody. The accused had no prior record and had been in a stable job for several years. A conviction could have put her employment at risk.
[42] In R. v. Sloan,[12] the Provincial Court of Alberta fined a 19-year-old man with no criminal record $500 for reporting that a police officer had detained him and stolen $200 from him. It was the accused's father who initially lodged the complaint. Ultimately, the investigation showed that the theft was committed by criminals dressed up as police officers. The accused had just completed high school and was on the waiting list for a post-secondary business program.
[43] In R. v. Steinson,[13] a woman made a false statement to CrimeStoppers in order to have greater access to her child. In her statement, she informed the police that the father of her child fit the profile of a killer. The police follow-up was quite limited. Subsequently, she also stated that the child had been abused by his father. The accused has mental health problems and a minor criminal history for theft. She was sentenced to 45 days in custody, followed by a period of one year's probation.
[44] Finally, in a Court Martial decision, a female soldier falsely stated that she was sexually assaulted by a male soldier, who was arrested then released. In the investigation, she rapidly admitted to lying. She apologized to her fellow soldier. She was sentenced to 30 days in custody.
IV. APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT CASE
[45] The Court must send a clear message to the accused and to anyone who might be tempted to falsely accuse police officers as he did. The integrity of the judicial system, including the integrity of police investigations, is at stake.
[46] In light of the sentencing principles and the jurisprudence, there is no doubt that the accused deserves a sentence of imprisonment. Denunciation and deterrence must take precedence over the accused's rehabilitation, which is not, however, to be set aside, given his emotional vulnerability and young age and because this is his first brush with the law.
[47] The aggravating and mitigating factors and the accused's personality demonstrate heavy criminal responsibility. While it is true that his mother is a negative influence on him, the accused is not totally without common sense and intelligence. He had many opportunities to end the officer's ordeal and, according to him, his own as well. He did nothing. We are not talking about a short, routine investigation as in some of the aforementioned decisions; a one-month specialized investigation was necessary for the truth to come out. The State put considerable effort and resources into solving the case. It adopted a comprehensive investigative process aimed at transparent criminal investigations of peace officers suspected of committing an indictable offence. The accused allowed this costly system to be set in motion without really giving any thought to the fact that he was harming a young police officer's life, work and self-confidence. Had it not been for the discovery in extremis of the data providing a video of the event, the police officer would have been liable to criminal prosecution that could have ended in her dismissal. The accused preferred to maintain his complaint for fear of displeasing his mother. At a minimum, that is a sign of profound immaturity and of a striking lack of empathy. Even when confronted with flagrant evidence of the police officer's innocence, he maintained that he felt his ATV being pushed by the patrol vehicle. His mother believes the video to be a fake. He does not really know what to think. Clearly, his living environment is not conducive to his rehabilitation, which rules out a conditional sentence of imprisonment. The Court reiterates and concurs with the remarks of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in Little, supra, that, given the dynamics of the family and the accused's emotional fragility, it is doubtful they would be conducive to his rehabilitation. That is especially true in that the accused's environment, from which he has not dissociated himself, openly expresses hatred of the police. The Court shares the probation officer's opinion that the risk of reoffending remains present. That risk means that, in the event of a conditional sentence, it would not be possible to protect the community. It is important to note that it is a small community and that the police charged with maintaining order and protecting the citizens of Quyon and the surrounding area are also part of that community because they are in daily contact with the inhabitants. Accordingly, the Court believes that a conditional sentence would not adequately protect the community in which the accused would serve his sentence. No option other than living with his mother in Quyon was proposed.
[48] Although his school plans are relatively vague, as are, to an even greater extent, his plans to study automobile mechanics in the future, the Court cannot disregard the fact that, given the young age of the accused, such plans are realistic and conducive to rehabilitation. The Court must avoid jeopardizing them. In that regard, probationary follow-up will facilitate his reintegration into the community and provide him with the tools necessary to help him take charge of his life.
THEREFORE, THE COURT:
SENTENCES THE ACCUSED to 90 days to be served intermittently in accordance with the terms of the probation order;
ISSUES a three-year supervised probation order with the following conditions:
- Keep the peace and be of good behaviour;
- Appear before the court when required to do so;
- Notify the probation officer prior to any change of address or of name, and rapidly advise him/her of any change of employment or occupation;
- Report to a probation officer by the June 12, 2013 before 4 P.M. and, thereafter, as required by the probation officer and in the manner directed by him/her; furthermore, you must cooperate in interviews and follow the instructions of your probation officer;
- Report to Hull Detention Centre in Gatineau on Saturday June 15th, 2013 at 9 A.M. and remain at the detention centre until Sunday June 16, 2013 at 4 P.M. and thereafter every Saturdays 9 A.M. until Sunday 4 P.M. and this, until the expiry of his jail sentence;
- Perform, according to the terms and conditions indicated by your probation officer, 100 hours of community service within 18 months;
- Take the measures necessary to complete his studies or training program. He must give the probation officer all information requested from him in that respect. He must give all necessary authorizations so that the probation officer can check his school or training record or his efforts to find work.
DISPENSES the accused from paying the victim surcharge, given his financial situation (no income).
__________________________________
RICHARD LAFLAMME J.C.Q.
| |
Mtre. Jennifer Morin
| |
Criminal and Penal Prosecuting Attorney
| |
Mtre. Louis Legault
| |
Counsel for the accused
| |
Dates of hearing: November 13, 2012, January 30, 2013, June 12, 2013
| |
[1] R. v. Chung, 2012 ABPC 187; R. v. Di Gianni 2011 ONCJ 792; R. v. Gould [2011] N.J. No. 121; R. v. T.S. 2011 ONCJ 233; R. v. M. (C.A.), 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500.
[4] R. v. Coupal, 2010 QCCA 1946.
[5] L.T. v. R., 2002-10-001346-027, C.A.Q., July 9, 2002.
[6] R. v. Brun 2006 NBCA 17.
[7] R. v. Evenden, 83 N.S.R. (2d) 167 (1988).
[8] Boileau v. R. [1993] R.D.S.D. No. 119.
[10] R. v. Gould, [2011] N.J. No. 121.
Comments
Post a Comment