Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams. Click here. Let's consider this case in the event that there was a missing engine at the time of the sale although the seller represented that the vehicle was road worthy and drivable. This would raise the issue of misrepresentation for the exam answer and also we could say mistake where there is no meeting of the minds between the parties and as such, no contract has formed. Did you order one container of Hubba bubba with rims from China or two containers? If you did not order two containers and two containers arrive, then we check the contract and see what was communicated. You pay according to what was ordered in the contract and not what appears on the dock after shipping. Payment is usually made in part prior to shipping or in full just like with Amazon who also takes on the burden of insurance of the goods until delivered. This is the double bubble. If two 1973 Jenn Air(TM) microwaves show up and you only ordered one, then you are to return the second microwave and only pay for what you ordered. Otherwise, it could be theft.

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Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams

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Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams
Morris Twelve first registered February 1939.JPG
Morris Motor, 1939 model
CourtCourt of Appeal
Citation(s)[1956] EWCA Civ 5. [1957] 1 WLR 370
Case opinions
Denning LJ
Keywords
Term, representation, intention

Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] EWCA Civ 5 is an English contract law case, concerning the difference between a term and a representation.

Facts[edit]

Williams sold Oscar Chess Ltd a Morris car for £290. It was described as a 1948 Morris 10, but it was really a 1939 model worth £175. Williams said it was 1948 in good faith, relying on the car log book, but the book was a forgery.

Judgment[edit]

Denning LJ said the term could only possibly be a warranty, whose ordinary meaning is ‘to denote a binding promise’.[1] In Cross v Gardner[2] Holt CJ held that ‘An affirmation at the time of a sale is a warranty, provided it appears on evidence to be so intended.’ And this was the ordinary English meaning of a binding promise. But in Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton[3] Lord Haldane LC and Lord Moulton said ‘warranty’ in a technical sense, distinguished from a condition. The crucial point of this case was not whether the representation was a warranty or condition, but a term of the contract at all. It followed that Williams’ statement was a mere representation.

One final word… [the motor dealers only checked the log book] eight months later. They are experts, and, not having made that check at the time, I do not think they should now be allowed to recover against the innocent seller who produced to them all the evidence he had, namely, the registration book... If the rogue can be traced, he can be sued by whomsoever has suffered the loss: but if he cannot be traced, the loss must lie where it falls. It should not be inflicted on innocent sellers, who sold the car many months, perhaps many years before…’

It followed that the statement did not become a term because a reasonable man (objective test) in the position of the car dealer (Oscar Chess Ltd) would not have thought that a person with no experience in the car market would have guaranteed the truth of the statement.

Hodson LJ concurred and Morris LJ dissented because he thought the parties did intend it to be a warranty.

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Chandelor v Lopus (1603) Cro.Jac 4
  2. ^ (1689) Cart. 90
  3. ^ [1913] AC 30

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