Written at FSJ's Law Analysis Page with research provided by Angel Ronan Lex Scripta ™: Much like 9/11 and the Victims of 9/12 law suits, there are victims of COVID law suits now in play. Many are becoming class action law suits when the authority of the government at this hour should have been used to implement the income support for every citizen and Monarch who does not have their support. The authority should have been used for this purpose to ensure everyone is innoculated from the viral joblessness caused by Automation. If you say there is a disease, that is one thing but if you harass people to comply to ordinances involving that alleged disease, how do we ensure that we are not causing alarm and distress contrary to the Criminal Law? This is not to question any endeavour but the there has to be a proportionate and legal method on addressing the alleged disease that does not offend our laws. This never happened during Sars or Aids except for public education to stop the spread. No civil liberties or criminal laws in corollary were violated. If you do Delta or Omicron, what would that be? Can it stand satisfy some quantitative analysis? Does the Omciron approximate Herpes, Aids, TB or TB or TB? Is that Alarm, distress or intimidation? Click here.
In Europe, We see Directive 2011/24/EU confirming Article 8 rights.
As a principle Directive 2011/24/EU extends patients’ choice options to healthcare
providers in another Member State irrespective of whether or not they are contracted
by the statutory health system in that Member State. This raises two particular and
related questions:
First, to what extent does this put pressure on member states to extend choice
options and also allow reimbursement for non-contracted providers domestically?
Indeed, several Member States signalled that in the context of the transposition of the
cross-border care Directive private non-contracted providers were claiming “equal
treatment” with foreign providers whose services would be reimbursed under the provider remains a financially feasible option for the patient. In a written to a question
from Dutch MEP Ria Oomen-Ruyten in September 2013 (E-010662/13) Health
Commissioner Borg made clear that this lower reimbursement could not automatically
apply to cross-border health services: “the application of reimbursement tariffs or
amounts lower than those used for care received from contracted providers in the
Netherlands would amount to a disincentive for patients to use their rights to cross-
border healthcare. It would therefore constitute an obstacle to the exercise of free
movement, and would need to be justified with reference to overriding reasons of
general interest. It would also need to be demonstrated that this obstacle was both
proportionate and necessary with regard to the desired objective.” The Dutch
government proposed to abolish the insurers’ obligation to reimburse non-contracted
care, at least for secondary care, which would reduce free choice of provider in the
Netherlands. In an advice to the First Chamber the highest administrative court has
found this proposal consistent with European law, i.e. the Directive 2011/24. However,
the amendment was not adopted in Parliament.
Another issue is whether the absence of choice options domestically because the
specific care or expertise is not available in the country (e.g. rare diseases) could
justify to getting care and/or second opinion in another member state. Also the
applicability of conditions that actually limit choice need to be questioned as to their conformity with EU rules, such as referrals by a domestic provider or the requirement
that first all domestic treatment options have to be exhausted.
The Country Expert reports show that in the area of enforcement the Directive has
produced little specific impact. Countries all had complaint and compensation schemes
in place, and individuals coming from outside the country are not given special routes
to complaint or compensation. In line with the Directive, individuals seeking to use
their cross-border rights are simply treated as ‘insiders’ for the purposes of
enforcement.
National Contact Points are charged with provid
Directive even without being contracted by the cross-border patients’ health insurer.
In Estonia an amendment to the legislation was pushed in 2013 by private providers
that would allow patients to obtain specialist day care and inpatient care without
waiting time from any provider while receiving full reimbursement from the statutory
health insurance fund at a later date. Even if from a legal perspective this could not be
sustained, the political argument was that in this way no public health insurance
money would be exported, as otherwise patients would get the treatment in Latvia or
Finland.
Secondly, to what extent are member states allowed to limit reimbursement for cross-
border care to rates that are applicable to non-contracted providers? Indeed, some
countries traditionally apply differential reimbursement for different types of providers.
For instance, in Austria a patient who seeks treatment with a non-contracted provider,
will obtain a lower reimbursement of 80% of the fee that would have been paid
directly to a contracted physician performing the same service. Also in the Netherlands
patients with an in-kind policy, which guarantees them free-of-charge health services
from providers who have been contracted by their health insurer, can only obtain
reimbursement at a lower level if they seek treatment from a non-contracted provider
(Article 13 of the Dutch Health Insurance Act). Based on the so-called “hindrance
criterium” this level should be “substantial” so that it treatment from a non-contracted.
Courtesy of Wikipedia, Article 8 clearly provides a right to be free of unlawful searches, but the Court has given the protection for "private and family life" that this article provides a broad interpretation, taking for instance that prohibition of private consensual homosexual acts violates this article. This may be compared to the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, which has also adopted a somewhat broad interpretation of the right to privacy. Furthermore, Article 8 sometimes comprises positive obligations: whereas classical human rights are formulated as prohibiting a State from interfering with rights, and thus not to do something (e.g. not to separate a family under family life protection), the effective enjoyment of such rights may also include an obligation for the State to become active, and to do something (e.g. to enforce access for a divorced father to his child).
- Golder v. United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR 524 – A prisoner requested a lawyer because he said he wanted to sue a guard for defamation. Access was denied. This violated the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR) and client confidentiality.[4]
- Silver v. United Kingdom (1981) 3 EHRR 475 – Censorship of a prisoner's correspondence regarding conditions in prison breached Article 8.
- R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 – Article 8 was deemed not to "[invalidate] a law which forbids violence which is intentionally harmful to body and mind" (specifically, assault occasioning actual bodily harm as part of consensual sadomasochistic sex acts) by the UK House of Lords.[5]
- Rotaru v. Romania [2000] ECHR 192 – Public information that is systematically collected and stored in files held by a state or its agents falls within the scope of private life.[6]
- Pretty v. United Kingdom [2002] Article 8 extends to protect the right to die. Like with articles 9, 10 and 11, it can be interfered with provided there's valid justification, as there was in Pretty.
- Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) — Per Eady J, equitable breach of confidence is extended to protect Art. 8 rights.
- S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581 – Retention of DNA information in respect of persons arrested but not convicted of an offence was held to breach Article 8.
- A, B and C v Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032 – Article 8 does not confer a "right to abortion", but the Republic of Ireland breached it by making it difficult for a woman to establish whether she qualifies for a legal abortion.
- Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom [2010] ECHR 28 – Stop and search powers granted to police under ss. 44–47 of the Terrorism Act 2000 were neither sufficiently circumscribed nor subject to adequate legal safeguards against abuse. As such, the Court found the powers not to be "in accordance with the law", in violation of Article 8.[7]
- Birmingham City Council v Clue (2010) EWCA Civ 460 29/4/2010 – A challenge to the decision to refuse to provide Ms Clue and her family with essential support pending the UK Border Agency's determination of her application for indefinite leave to remain in the UK. In a ground-breaking decision of the Court of Appeal, the judgment extends the scope of community care provision for families subject to immigration control who seek to remain in the UK on Article 8 ECHR grounds.
- Plantagenet Alliance v Ministry of Justice and others (2014) EWHC 1662 – Article 8 did not entitle modern-day descendants of the House of Plantagenet to be consulted on the place of re-interment of Richard III.
- Zakharov v. Russia (2015) – The Court examined Russian surveillance legislation in abstracto, finding unanimously that the existence of inadequate legislation and its application in practice themselves amounted to a violation of the applicant's rights under Article 8.[8]
- The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission's Application [2015] NIQB 96 – Northern Ireland's criminalization of abortion in cases of fatal foetal abnormality, rape or incest declared incompatible with Article 8[9]
- Aycaguer v. France (2017) -- ECHR found France's use of biological sampling for criminal DNA databases to be a violation of Article 8 in the case of Jean-Michel Aycaguer, a french national convicted of non-violent crime. Importantly, the court did not find the entire practice to be in violation, but claimed that the seriousness of Aycaguer's crimes did not constitute a situation wherein public interest outweighed his right to privacy in his private life.[10]
The notion of private life in the Article 8 is also interpreted as including some duty of environmental protection.[11]
Mass surveillance, such as by the programs revealed in Edward Snowden's global surveillance disclosures, is often accused of violating the 8th article of the European Convention on Human Rights.[15][16][17][18][19]
A 2014 report to the UN General Assembly by the United Nations' top official for counter-terrorism and human rights condemned mass electronic surveillance as a clear violation of core privacy rights guaranteed by multiple treaties and conventions and makes a distinction between "targeted surveillance" – which "depend[s] upon the existence of prior suspicion of the targeted individual or organization" – and "mass surveillance", by which "states with high levels of Internet penetration can [] gain access to the telephone and e-mail content of an effectively unlimited number of users and maintain an overview of Internet activity associated with particular websites". Only targeted interception of traffic and location data in order to combat serious crime, including terrorism, is justified, according to a decision by the European Court of Justice.[20]
According to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994
51Intimidation, etc., of witnesses, jurors and others.)F1(1)
A person commits an offence if—
(a)he does an act which intimidates, and is intended to intimidate, another person (“the victim”),
(b)he does the act knowing or believing that the victim is assisting in the investigation of an offence or is a witness or potential witness or a juror or potential juror in proceedings for an offence, and
(c)he does it intending thereby to cause the investigation or the course of justice to be obstructed, perverted or interfered with.
(2)A person commits an offence if—
(a)he does an act which harms, and is intended to harm, another person or, intending to cause another person to fear harm, he threatens to do an act which would harm that other person,
(b)he does or threatens to do the act knowing or believing that the person harmed or threatened to be harmed (“the victim”), or some other person, has assisted in an investigation into an offence or has given evidence or particular evidence in proceedings for an offence, or has acted as a juror or concurred in a particular verdict in proceedings for an offence, and
(c)he does or threatens to do it because of that knowledge or belief.
(3)For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) it is immaterial that the act is or would be done, or that the threat is made—
(a)otherwise than in the presence of the victim, or
(b)to a person other than the victim.]
(4)The harm that may be done or threatened may be financial as well as physical (whether to the person or a person’s property) and similarly as respects an intimidatory act which consists of threats.
(5)The intention required by subsection (1)(c) and the motive required by subsection (2)(c) above need not be the only or the predominating intention or motive with which the act is done or, in the case of subsection (2), threatened.
(6)A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a)on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine or both;
(b)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
(7)If, in proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1) above, it is proved that he did an act falling within paragraph (a) with the knowledge or belief required by paragraph (b), he shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to have done the act with the intention required by paragraph (c) of that subsection.
(8)If, in proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (2) above, it is proved that [F2within the relevant period—
(a)he did an act which harmed, and was intended to harm, another person, or
(b)intending to cause another person fear of harm, he threatened to do an act which would harm that other person,
and that he did the act, or (as the case may be) threatened to do the act,] with the knowledge or belief required by paragraph (b), he shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to have done the act [F3or (as the case may be) threatened to do the act] with the motive required by________
FfFfFfFFfFFFfFFF
Byparagraph (c) of that subsection.
A person commits an offence if—(a)(a) he does an aich intimidates, and is intended to intimidate, another per(a)he does an act which intimidates, and
(b
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