Supreme Court Judgments R. v. Shoker Collection Supreme Court Judgments Date 2006-10-13 Neutral citation 2006 SCC 44 Report [2006] 2 SCR 399 Case number 30779 Judges McLachlin, Beverley; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; LeBel, Louis; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise On appeal from British Columbia Subjects Criminal law Notes SCC Case Information: 30779

Supreme Court Judgments

R. v. Shoker

Collection	Supreme Court Judgments
Date	2006-10-13
Neutral citation	2006 SCC 44
Report	[2006] 2 SCR 399
Case number	30779
Judges	McLachlin, Beverley; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; LeBel, Louis; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise
On appeal from	British Columbia
Subjects	Criminal law
Notes	SCC Case Information: 30779

 

                                                 SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

 

Citation:  R. v. Shoker, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 399, 2006 SCC 44

Date:  20061013 Docket:  30779

 

Between:

Her Majesty The Queen

Appellant

and

Harjit Singh Shoker

Respondent

‑ and ‑

Attorney General of Canada and

Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario)

Interveners

 

Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.

 

Reasons for Judgment: (paras. 1 to 26)   Concurring Reasons: (paras. 27 to 44)

Charron J. (McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, Fish and Abella JJ. concurring)   LeBel J. (Bastarache J. concurring)

 

 

______________________________

R. v. Shoker, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 399, 2006 SCC 44

 

Her Majesty The Queen                                                                                  Appellant

 

v.

 

Harjit Singh Shoker                                                                                       Respondent

 

and

 

Attorney General of Canada and

Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario)                                                     Interveners

 

Indexed as:  R. v. Shoker

 

Neutral citation:  2006 SCC 44.

 

File No.:  30779.

 

2006:  February 14; 2006:  October 13.

 

Present:  McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.

 

on appeal from the court of appeal for british columbia

 

Criminal law — Sentencing — Probation — Accused convicted of entering a dwelling house with intent to commit assault and sentenced to incarceration followed by two years of probation subject to conditions — Probation order requires accused to abstain from consumption and possession of alcohol and non‑prescription narcotics and  to provide bodily substances on demand by probation officer or peace officer to monitor compliance with abstention condition — Whether sentencing judge had jurisdiction under Criminal Code  to authorize search and seizure of bodily substances as part of probation order — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, ss. 732.1(3) (c), 732.1(3) (h).

 

The accused was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit sexual assault.  A psychological pre‑sentencing report revealed that accused blamed his drug use for his behaviour and recommended requiring the accused to submit to random urinalysis to manage his risk in the community.  The accused was sentenced to imprisonment followed by probation.  The probation order required that he abstain absolutely from the consumption and possession of alcohol and non‑prescription narcotics and, to determine compliance with the abstention condition, that he submit to urinalysis, blood tests or breathalyzer tests upon the demand of a peace officer or probation officer.  The order also stated that any positive reading would be a breach of the abstention condition.  A majority of the Court of Appeal held that ss. 732.1(3) (c) and 732.1(3) (h) of the Criminal Code  grant a sentencing judge statutory authority to include a monitoring condition in a probation order but that compelling the accused to provide bodily samples, in the absence of a governing regulatory or statutory framework, is contrary to s. 8  of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .  The Court of Appeal also held that the sentencing judge had no jurisdiction to predetermine that a positive reading was a breach of probation.

 

Held:  The appeal should be dismissed.

 

Per McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.:  The majority of the Court of Appeal was correct to delete that part of the probation order compelling the accused to provide bodily samples and stating that any positive reading will be a breach of probation.  Although a condition requiring abstention from consumption and possession of alcohol and non‑prescription narcotics is authorized under the Criminal Code , and was reasonable in the accused’s circumstances, the sentencing judge had no authority under ss. 732.1(3)(c) and 732.1(3)(h) of the Code to authorize a search and seizure of bodily substances as part of a probation order.  Nor did he have jurisdiction to predetermine that any positive reading would constitute a breach of probation. [3] [17] [26]

 

Section 732.1(3)(c), which allows an abstention condition, defines a criminal offence, but enforcement powers are not implicit from the simple creation of an offence.  While the power to demand bodily samples and the resulting analyses would undoubtedly assist in the enforcement of a s. 732.1(3)(c) abstention condition, it cannot be implied on that basis.  Under s. 732.1(3)(h), a court is given a broad power to craft other reasonable conditions for the purpose of protecting society and for facilitating the accused’s reintegration into the community.  However, s. 732.1(3)(h) is not unlimited and must be read in context.  The conditions set out in s. 732.1(3) can assist in delineating the scope of this residual provision.  These listed conditions relate to conduct, or abstention from conduct, the fulfilment of which has no incriminating consequence for the probationer.  When a condition may pose a risk, such as participating in a treatment program, the consent of the probationer is required.  Conditions compelling bodily samples to facilitate the gathering of evidence for enforcement purposes do not simply monitor the probationer’s behaviour and, as such, are of a different kind and, because of their potential effect, absent the probationer’s consent to such conditions, raise constitutional concerns.  The seizure of bodily samples must be subject to stringent standards and safeguards to meet constitutional requirements.  Where Parliament authorizes the collection of bodily samples, it uses clear language and sets out standards and safeguards for collecting these samples.  Parliament has not provided a scheme under s. 732.1(3) for collecting bodily samples and such a scheme cannot be judicially enacted. [20-25]

 

Per Bastarache and LeBel JJ.:  Under well‑established rules of statutory interpretation, s. 732.1(3)(h) of the Criminal Code  grants authority to include monitoring procedures in probation orders, including the condition imposed on the accused that he provide bodily samples.  Section 732.1(3)(h) must be read in the context of probation and sentencing.  A probation order addresses the imperatives of the protection of society and the rehabilitation of the accused.  Sentencing judges are required to devise terms that are reasonable in the sense that they complement these objectives and the terms set out in s. 732.1(3).  The residual clause allows judges to frame conditions to fit the distinct situation of each accused.  So long as a reasonable condition can be connected with the categories of terms contemplated by the Code, it is grounded in an implied, but solid, statutory authority. Although the Code provides for conditions concerning alcohol and drug use, it is silent about monitoring these conditions.  This Court has acknowledged implied statutory powers when the need for them flows from the substantive provisions of a law, and the need for a monitoring mechanism may arise from the nature of the obligations imposed on an accused in a probation order.  To hold otherwise would cast doubt on a number of useful monitoring methods used to ensure that the goals of probation are met.  However, any condition of a probation order requiring monitoring of an accused is open to review under s. 8  of the Charter .  In this case, the monitoring condition does not meet the requirements of s. 8.  Compelling blood tests absent a statutory framework governing such tests is not consistent with the Charter  and random drug testing at a probation officer’s discretion could become highly arbitrary. [30-37] [42-43]

 

The part of the order stating that a positive test will be a breach of probation is contrary to criminal law principles that require guilt to be proved in the usual manner. [41]

 

Cases Cited

 

By Charron J.

 

Referred to:  R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, 2000 SCC 5; R. v. Kootenay (2000), 150 C.C.C. (3d) 311; R. v. Traverse (2006), 205 C.C.C. (3d) 33; R. v. Ziatas (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 287; R. v. Caja (1977), 36 C.C.C. (2d) 401; R. v. Lavender (1981), 59 C.C.C. (2d) 551; R. v. L. (1986), 50 C.R. (3d) 398; R. v. McLeod (1993), 81 C.C.C. (3d) 83; R. v. Borden, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145; R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607; R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, 2001 SCC 83; Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.

 

By LeBel J.

 

Referred to: R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393; R. v. Carlson (1996), 141 Sask. R. 168; R. v. Curtis (1996), 144 Sask. R. 156; R. v. McLeod (1992), 109 Sask. R. 8; Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, 2000 SCC 69.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

 

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , ss. 1 , 8 .

 

Correctional Institution Regulation, Alta. Reg. 205/2001, ss. 48.1, 48.2.

 

Correctional Institutions Regulation, Man. Reg. 227/92, ss. 28, 29, 29.1, 31(1).

 

Correctional Services Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C‑26.1, s. 17(g).

 

Correctional Services Act, S.M. 1998, c. 47, C.C.S.M. c. C230, s. 16.

 

Correctional Services Act, S.S. 1993, c. C‑39.1, s. 56(1).

 

Correctional Services Administration, Discipline and Security Regulations, 2003, R.R.S., c. C‑39.1, Reg. 3, s. 40(1).

 

Correctional Services Regulation, Man. Reg. 128/99, ss. 41 to 45.

 

Corrections Accountability Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 40, s. 57.9(1) to (3).

 

Corrections Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-29, ss. 14.1, 14.2.

 

Corrections and Conditional Release Act , S.C. 1992, c. 20 , ss. 54  to 57 .

 

Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620, ss. 60 to 72.

 

Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46 , ss. 253  to 261 , 487.04  to 487.091 , 718  to 718.2 , 731 , 732.1(2) , (3) , 733.1 , 742.3(2) (f).

 

P.E.I. Reg. EC616/92, ss. 10, 11.

 

Authors Cited

 

Beaulac, Stéphane, and Pierre‑André Côté. “Driedger’s ‘Modern Principle’ at the Supreme Court of Canada:  Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization” (2006), 40 R.J.T. 131.

 

Ferris, Thomas Wayne.  Sentencing:  Practical Approaches.  Markham, Ont.:  Butterworths, 2005.

 

Manson, Allan, Patrick Healy and Gary Trotter. Sentencing and Penal Policy in Canada:  Cases, Materials, and Commentary.  Toronto:  Emond Montgomery, 2000.

 

Ruby, Clayton C.  Sentencing, 6th ed.  Markham, Ont.:  Butterworths, 2004.

APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (Finch C.J.B.C. and Hall and Levine JJ.A.) (2004), 206 B.C.A.C. 266, 338 W.A.C. 266, 192 C.C.C. (3d) 176, 26 C.R. (6th) 97, 126 C.R.R. (2d) 149, [2004] B.C.J. No. 2626 (QL), 2004 BCCA 643, deleting part of a probation order.  Appeal dismissed.

 

Wendy L. Rubin and Susan J. Brown, for the appellant.

 

Garth Barriere and Dana Kripp, for the respondent.

 

Kenneth J. Yule, Q.C., and David Schermbrucker, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.

 

James Stribopoulos and Sarah Loosemore, for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario).

 

The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ. was delivered by

 

Charron J. —