Adverse Impact Discrimination and The Income support in Otario and differences in provision based on gender. At Angel Ronan(TM), we respect gender differences. We respect the energy spent over the centuries to ensure the rights, hope and beliefs of all citizens are respected and protected by law. This would include the equal provision of benefits and if men received a $50,000.00 income support just because they are men while women and transgender people did not, it would be a glaring upset on the issue of equality in what would also be a most evident disparity in the provision of benefits. The current regime or status quo concerning the automatic provision in Otario of an income support to transgender individuals only and not to other genders is an evident disparity. It also creates a wedge of separateness between the non-transgender and the other genders who work with and support the transgender school friends and work colleagues every day. Transgender people are every where like Metropolis TV; everywhere. We support the lawyers and firms who are working on this human rights case in the Human Rights Tribunal for an easy jewel of success in their memorable collections of experience. As a lawyer allegedly, President Bush Senior strongly disapproved of this or any kind of disparity. Its not the American way. Look at Vermont for example. Angel Ronan is not involved in the litigation that is now transpiring in this matter. President Bush Senior was a Lawyer and if he had known about this disparity in Otario affecting the volume of car sales, it would have been resolved in 1/2 a second. We have provided, however, some rather useful litigation strategy from our research library and some research from our Lex Scripta 'members only' research library so that the matter shall not dither nor languish before the Courts or tribunals. Apparently, Lord Durham told his children and the natives of Port Perry that he was the real King of England; certainly not so. The real Monarch is the real Queen; in England. Click here.

Similar to Fraser v. Canada noted below, The human rights applicant concerned about the disparate provision of income support in Otario does not suggest that the disparate negative Otario scenario and its consequences stemming from an automatic unconditional support of $50,000.00 provided only to transgender people are explicitly based on sex. Rather, the applicant claims that they have an adverse impact on men or women who are not transgender and who can reproduce in the usual course of procreation. The adverse impact from the Otario Income support scheme is most evident especially if the non transgender individual does not live in certain neighborhoods such as Oatsville or Sarduinia where such normally procreating individuals may receive $20,000.00 per year but not the $50,000.00 per year provided to all transgender citizens even if the transgender benefit recipient does have a job. This is illegal.

Griggs explains that the application of “neutral” rules may not produce equality in substance for disadvantaged groups. Membership in such groups often brings with it a unique constellation of physical, economic and social barriers. Laws which distribute benefits or burdens without accounting for those differences — without accounting for the “posture and condition of the job seeker”, as in Griggs — are the prime targets of indirect discrimination claims. I agree with Profs. Lisa Philipps and Margot Young that

we are not always conscious of the ways in which the distinctions we draw . . . will implicate group identities and single out specific groups for distinctive treatment. This is because the constellations of factors or characteristics that go into the construction of identities often masquerade as unconnected, purely individual traits, behaviours, choices, or situations. Yet, in social reality they may be tightly linked to one group or another. So the law has had to recognize that state action may be discriminatory even though on its face and in terms of the intentions informing it there is no obvious evidence that such discrimination is occurring. [p. 258]-Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971

In the Otario scheme, there is certain, evident discrimination taking place.

The problem is legislative evidence except many people can confirm their experience with affidavit evidence including government benefit policy and T5 statements confirming $49000 to 51000.00 per year as transgender individuals and that they do actually receive a benefit with or without application from 12 years old. It is our intention that every citizen will receive the equal benefit, every citizen like all other provinces, and that the current provision is made available to some citizens or others certainly by an order of the government under the ODSP ACT 1997 possibly under s.6. that provides for exceptional circumstances but not to all citizens with or without disability. This may be adverse impact discrimination. Adverse impact discrimination, as noted below, has been a “central trend in the development of discrimination law.

Please see Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 (CanLII) and the following excerpt:

How adverse impact or systemic discrimination is applied has received extensive academic consideration (see, for example, Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in Canada (2010), at pp. 19‑21; Evelyn Braun, “Adverse Effect Discrimination: Proving the Prima Facie Case” (2005), 11 Rev. Const. Stud. 119; Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Jennifer Koshan, “Adverse Impact: The Supreme Court’s Approach to Adverse Effects Discrimination under Section 15 of the Charter” (2015), 19 Rev. Const. Stud. 191; Michèle Rivet and Anne‑Marie Santorineos, “Juger à l’ère des droits fondamentaux” (2012), 42 R.D.U.S. 363, at p. 374; Diane L. Demers, “La discrimination systémique: variation sur un concept unique” (1993), 8 C.J.L.S. 83; Lisa Philipps and Margot Young, “Sex, Tax and the Charter: A Review of Thibaudeau v. Canada” (1995), 2 Rev. Const. Stud. 221). As Prof. Colleen Sheppard notes:

Why is it so critical to expand on our understanding of adverse effect discrimination? If we do not, there is a significant risk that discrimination embedded in apparently neutral institutional policies, rules, or procedures will not be recognized as discriminatory. This risk is accentuated by the necessity in anti‑discrimination law to connect the experience of exclusion, harm, prejudice, or disadvantage to a recognized ground of discrimination. . . . We need a sophisticated and coherent theory of adverse effect discrimination to assist claimants, lawyers, and adjudicators with the complexities of the manifestations of systemic discrimination.

(“Of Forest Fires and Systemic Discrimination: A Review of British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U.” (2001), 46 McGill L.J. 533, at p. 542; see also Braun, at p. 122.)

[30] It is helpful to start by defining the concept. Adverse impact discrimination occurs when a seemingly neutral law has a disproportionate impact on members of groups protected on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground (see Watson Hamilton and Koshan (2015), at p. 196; Sheppard (2001), at p. 549; see also Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12 (CanLII), [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396, at para. 64; Taypotat, at para. 22). Instead of explicitly singling out those who are in the protected groups for differential treatment, the law indirectly places them at a disadvantage (Sophia Moreau, “What Is Discrimination?” (2010), 38 Philosophy & Public Affairs 143, at p. 155).

[31] Increased awareness of adverse impact discrimination has been a “central trend in the development of discrimination law”, marking a shift away from a fault‑based conception of discrimination towards an effects‑based model which critically examines systems, structures, and their impact on disadvantaged groups (Denise G. Réaume, “Harm and Fault in Discrimination Law: The Transition from Intentional to Adverse Effect Discrimination” (2001), 2 Theor. Inq. L. 349, at pp. 350‑51; see also Béatrice Vizkelety, Proving Discrimination in Canada (1987), at p. 18; Sheppard (2010), at pp. 19‑20). Accompanying this shift was the recognition that discrimination is “frequently a product of continuing to do things ‘the way they have always been done’”, and that governments must be “particularly vigilant about the effects of their own policies” on members of disadvantaged groups (Fay Faraday, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Substantive Equality, Systemic Discrimination and Pay Equity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2020), 94 S.C.L.R. (2d) 301, at p. 310; Sophia Moreau, “The Moral Seriousness of Indirect Discrimination”, in Hugh Collins and Tarunabh Khaitan, eds., Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law (2018), 123, at p. 145).

[32] Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) was one of the first cases to apply this concept and is a classic example of adverse impact discrimination. An employer required employees to have a high school diploma and pass standardized tests to work in certain departments at a power plant. Neither requirement was significantly related to successful job performance; both, however, had the effect of disqualifying African Americans at a substantially higher rate than white applicants.

[33] The United States Supreme Court held that the education and testing requirements infringed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). The court emphasized that the Act prohibits “practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation”:

Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On the contrary, Congress has now required that the posture and condition of the job seeker be taken into account. It has — to resort again to the fable — provided that the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one all seekers can use. The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. . . . Good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as “built-in headwinds” for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability. [Emphasis added; pp. 431‑32.]

[34] Griggs explains that the application of “neutral” rules may not produce equality in substance for disadvantaged groups. Membership in such groups often brings with it a unique constellation of physical, economic and social barriers. Laws which distribute benefits or burdens without accounting for those differences — without accounting for the “posture and condition of the job seeker”, as in Griggs — are the prime targets of indirect discrimination claims. I agree with Profs. Lisa Philipps and Margot Young that

(See also Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd ed. 2011), at pp. 38 and 108.)

[35] Addressing adverse impact discrimination can be among the “most powerful legal measures available to disadvantaged groups in society to assert their claims to justice” (Hugh Collins and Tarunabh Khaitan, “Indirect Discrimination Law: Controversies and Critical Questions”, in Hugh Collins and Tarunabh Khaitan, eds., Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law (2018), 1, at p. 30). Not only is such discrimination “much more prevalent than the cruder brand of openly direct discrimination”,^{^[5]} it often poses a greater threat to the equality aspirations of disadvantaged groups:

. . . even more common are situations where the discrimination occurs in a context like an employment relationship, government program or statute, or educational setting, and there is no single identifiable “villain”, no single action identifiable as “discriminatory”, and the outward appearance of a neutral set of rules or practices being applied across the board. This invisible structure, with its accompanying set of practices, is a powerful limit on the equality aspirations of many who must deal within that structure but have characteristics that do not match those of persons intended to benefit from the structure.

(Mary Eberts and Kim Stanton, “The Disappearance of the Four Equality Rights and Systemic Discrimination from Canadian Equality Jurisprudence” (2018), 38 N.J.C.L. 89, at p. 92)

[36] By recognizing the exclusionary impact of such discrimination, courts can better address “discrimination in its diverse forms”, including at “the systemic or institutional level” (Vizkelety, at p. viii; see also Colleen Sheppard, “Mapping anti‑discrimination law onto inequality at work: Expanding the meaning of equality in international labour law” (2012), 151 Int’l Lab. Rev. 1, at p. 8; Faraday, at p. 319). Remedying adverse effects discrimination allows courts

[to] go to the heart of the equality question, to the goal of transformation, to an examination of the way institutions and relations must be changed in order to make them available, accessible, meaningful and rewarding for the many diverse groups of which our society is composed.

(Meiorin, at para. 41, quoting Shelagh Day and Gwen Brodsky, “The Duty to Accommodate: Who Will Benefit?” (1996), 75 Can. Bar Rev. 433, at p. 462)

[37] This Court first dealt with adverse impact discrimination in Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons‑Sears Ltd., 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536. Employees at a department store were periodically required to work on Friday evenings and Saturdays. Theresa O’Malley, an employee of the store and a member of the Seventh‑Day Adventist Church, was required by her faith to observe the Sabbath from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday. She brought a complaint against the store under the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1980, c. 340, claiming that the rule requiring her to work on Saturdays discriminated against her on the basis of religion.

[38] Writing for a unanimous Court, McIntyre J. agreed. He stressed that the Ontario Human Rights Code was meant to provide protection against the “result or the effect” of discriminatory conduct (p. 547). Citing Griggs and several Canadian decisions, McIntyre J. concluded that the Act prohibited adverse effects discrimination, which he distinguished from direct discrimination as follows:

A distinction must be made between what I would describe as direct discrimination and the concept already referred to as adverse effect discrimination in connection with employment. Direct discrimination occurs in this connection where an employer adopts a practice or rule which on its face discriminates on a prohibited ground. For example, “No Catholics or no women or no blacks employed here.” There is, of course, no disagreement in the case at bar that direct discrimination of that nature would contravene the Act. On the other hand, there is the concept of adverse effect discrimination. It arises where an employer for genuine business reasons adopts a rule or standard which is on its face neutral, and which will apply equally to all employees, but which has a discriminatory effect upon a prohibited ground on one employee or group of employees in that it imposes, because of some special characteristic of the employee or group, obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the work force. [p. 551]

[39] Simpsons‑Sears was the first of several human rights decisions where this Court grappled with adverse effects discrimination. In Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), 1987 CanLII 109 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 (“Action Travail”), Dickson C.J. upheld a discrimination claim against an employer whose hiring and promotion practices led to women being drastically under‑represented in certain jobs. Some of these practices were neutral on their face; Dickson C.J., however, highlighted the importance of looking “at the results of a system”:

A thorough study of “systemic discrimination” in Canada is to be found in the Abella Report on equality in employment.

. . .

Discrimination . . . means practices or attitudes that have, whether by design or impact, the effect of limiting an individual’s or a group’s right to the opportunities generally available because of attributed rather than actual characteristics . . . .

It is not a question of whether this discrimination is motivated by an intentional desire to obstruct someone’s potential, or whether it is the accidental by‑product of innocently motivated practices or systems. If the barrier is affecting certain groups in a disproportionately negative way, it is a signal that the practices that lead to this adverse impact may be discriminatory.

This is why it is important to look at the results of a system . . . . [Emphasis added; pp. 1138-39.]

[40] These principles were soon imported into the Court’s s. 15 jurisprudence. In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, 1989 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, the Court rejected a “sameness” or formal theory of equality, instead identifying substantive equality as the philosophical premise of s. 15 and outlining a theory of equality centred on “the impact of the law on the individual or the group concerned” (p. 165). In developing this theory, McIntyre J. emphatically rejected the approach to s. 15 adopted by the British Columbia Court of Appeal, which had defined the “essential meaning” of equality as ensuring that the “similarly situated be similarly treated” ((1986), 1986 CanLII 1287 (BC CA), 2 B.C.L.R. (2d) 305, at p. 311, quoting Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, “The Equal Protection of the Laws” (1949), 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341, at p. 344). Justice McIntyre described this approach as “seriously deficient”, on the basis that “mere equality of application to similarly situated groups or individuals does not afford a realistic test for a violation of equality rights” (pp. 165‑67).

[41] Drawing on the Court’s human rights jurisprudence, while recognizing that “not all distinctions and differentiations created by law are discriminatory” (at p. 182), McIntyre J. endorsed an approach to equality and discrimination that was centred on the actual effects, rather than the purpose or facial neutrality of a law on a claimant group:

I would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of society. [p. 174]

Andrews provided a robust template for substantive equality that subsequent decisions “enriched but never abandoned” (R. v. Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 (CanLII), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, at para. 14). It was a remedy for exclusion and a recipe for inclusion.

[42] Our subsequent decisions left no doubt that substantive equality is the “animating norm” of the s. 15 framework (Withler, at para. 2; see also Kapp, at paras. 15‑16; Alliance, at para. 25); and that substantive equality requires attention to the “full context of the claimant group’s situation”, to the “actual impact of the law on that situation”, and to the “persistent systemic disadvantages [that] have operated to limit the opportunities available” to that group’s members (Withler, at para. 43; Taypotat, at para. 17; see also Quebec v. A, at paras. 327‑32; Alliance, at para. 28; Centrale, at para. 35).

---------------------------------

The Income support in Otario and differences in provision based on gender. At Angel Ronan(TM), we respect gender differences. We respect the energy spent over the centuries to ensure the rights, hope and beliefs of all citizens are respected and protected by law. This would include the equal provision of benefits and if men received a $50,000.00 income support just because they are men while women and transgender people did not, it would be a glaring upset on the issue of equality in what would also be a most evident disparity in the provision of benefits. The current regime or status quo concerning the automatic provision in Otario of an income support to transgender individuals only and not to other genders is an evident disparity. It also creates a wedge of separateness between the non-transgender and the other genders who work with and support the transgender school friends and work colleagues every day. Transgender people are every where like Metropolis TV; everywhere. We support the lawyers and firms who are working on this human rights case in the Human Rights Tribunal for an easy jewel of success in their memorable collections of experience. As a lawyer allegedly, President Bush Senior strongly disapproved of this or any kind of disparity. Its not the American way. Look at Vermont for example.

Angel Ronan is not involved in the litigation that is now transpiring in this matter. However, we have provided some rather useful litigation strategy from our research library and some research from our Lex Scripta 'members only' research library so that the matter shall not dither nor languish before the Courts or tribunals. Apparently, Lord Durham told his children and the natives of Port Perry that he was the real King of England; certainly not so. The real Monarch is the real Queen; in England.

See Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624

See also Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 (CanLII).

See these above cases for the other supporting judgements that the counsel involved will be listing in their Tribunal application or Court motion.

Angel Ronan Lex Scripta- Another 9. 55 second Global Law Research Library World Record performance by Angel Ronan Lex Scripta.

This black American transgender woman who arrived in Otario in 2019 from New York as an immigrant receives a transgender income support of $50,000.00 per year In 2019, there was no such support at this life saving amount in Rochester New York or any where in New York state. Non -Transgender people do not receive this support in
Otario. This would mean a white male high school graduate in Otario was not receiving any support in 2019. All Canadian citizens; white males, black females, white females, and black males regardless of gender or race in Quebec, Alberta or Manitoba receive an income support of no less than $50,000.00 income support per year. Warren saw her while shopping in Lewiston for milk without the formaldehyde and told her to come to Canada as they might be able to help.

Paul Osgall Bridgerton-

Angel Ronan Entwerfen™ Firm; Journal, Intellectual Property with ENTWERFEN ™ Litigation

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